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I. INTRODUCTION
A trail connects a skyscraper in Manhattan’s Financial District to a tiny
food stand in a village in the southeast Indian state of Tamil Nadu.  Ini-
tially wild and overgrown, the trail now resembles a well-developed road,
cleared and shaped.  The trail does not connect customers to call centers
or raw materials to laborers; the path connects lenders seeking abnormal
returns on their investments to borrowers living in poverty.  This is the
path of private equity investments in microfinance.
Microfinance is a powerful financial innovation that has changed per-
sonal finance in many parts of the world.1  While microfinance began as
non-profit means of empowering low-income entrepreneurs, the promise
of scale, high repayment rates, and underserved markets has made
microfinance an increasingly attractive investment for profit-seeking in-
vestors.2  This observation is supported by an unprecedented level of pri-
vate equity investment in microfinance enterprises.3  Microfinance’s
promise as an investment opportunity is best exemplified in India, which
offers a vast low-income population, low penetration of personal financial
products, liberal regulatory policies, and cultural forces that support group
liability structures.4
This Note analyzes the investment potential of microfinance through
the scope of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in India in four parts.  Part
II describes the MFI business model and explores how MFIs create con-
tractual advantages and operational efficiencies in serving low-income
borrowers.  Part III explores how the Reserve Bank of India regulates
MFIs and the incentive effects of these regulations on MFI behavior.  Part
IV attempts to quantify the extent of private equity investment in MFIs.
Part V analyzes why private equity firms invest in MFIs and argues that
two emerging trends may make MFIs less attractive investments in the
future.
II. MICROFINANCE BUSINESS MODEL
A. Overview and History
Microfinance is defined as the large-scale provision of small loans and
other financial services to low-income people by conveniently located
commercial financial institutions.5  Microfinance is a broad term that en-
1. See MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION: SUSTAINABLE
FINANCE FOR THE POOR, at xxx (2001). Despite microfinance’s entrepreneurial focus, this
Note places microfinance under the heading of personal finance.
2. Id. at xxi–xxiv.
3. See PREETESH KANTAK, GROWTH IN COMMERCIAL MICROFINANCE: 2005-2008 7–8
(Council of Microfinance Equity Funds, Winter 2011), available at http://fiecouncil.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/Growth-in-Commercial-Microfinance-2008.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Vighneswara Swamy, Microfinance in India, 16 S. ASIAN J. MGMT. 166,
166–67 (2009) (book review).
5. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at xxx.
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compasses multiple offerings, including loans, deposit services, insurance,
and other personal financial products.6  From a personal finance perspec-
tive, microfinance enables low-income people to expand their en-
trepreneurial activities through access to capital, increase their income
through lower interest rates, and improve self-confidence.7  From a
macroeconomic perspective, microfinance reduces reliance on inefficient
government subsidies and regulations,8 while also increasing the flow of
capital into the formal financial sector to increase market liquidity.9  In
other words, using the example discussed supra, microfinance allows the
hypothetical Tamil food stand owner to borrow a small amount of money
to buy vegetables for her food stand, pay a low enough interest rate to
retain some of the stand’s profit, and empower herself by owning and op-
erating a small business.  When operating at a large scale, it empowers
millions of similar small-business owners, reduces the need for certain gov-
ernment programs, and brings money out from under mattresses and into
the financial system.
Microfinance generally follows two models: the poverty lending ap-
proach, which is donor- and government-funded, and the financial systems
approach, which is operated by self-sufficient financial intermediaries.10
Under the poverty lending approach, either non-governmental organiza-
tions use donor funding to lend to poor populations or large financial insti-
tutions provide subsidized credit to poor populations in response to
regulatory requirements.11  These methods suffer from obvious and well-
publicized drawbacks, namely a limited ability to originate loans, corrup-
tion by the intermediary institutions that receive funds to originate loans,
and losses caused by a mismatch between the interest earned from loans
(revenue) and the cost to serve borrowers (cost).12  On the other hand, the
financial systems approach operates through self-sufficient intermediaries
that rely upon large-scale loan origination, cost-effective servicing models,
and high repayment rates.13  The financial systems approach, which repre-
sents the private-sector formulation of microfinance, is the focus of this
Note.
One of the original and most influential models under the financial
systems approach is Muhammad Yunus’ Grameen Bank, which focuses on
6. BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE ECONOMICS OF
MICROFINANCE 14 (2005).
7. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at xxx.
8. Id.
9. GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, A HUNDRED SMALL STEPS: REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMS 108 (2009).
10. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 7–8.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id.; see also 2014 Economic Freedom Index: India, The HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/index/country/india (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
13. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 8.
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the provision of microcredit, a subset of microfinance.14  In the Grameen
Bank model, low-income individuals, 97% of whom are women, form
small, mutually binding borrowing groups that co-guarantee loans in lieu
of collateral.15  Borrowers then deploy capital to small-scale income-gen-
erating activities that vary depending on the community.16  Loan providers
service these loans through ultra-local, semi-autonomous branch units that
deploy mobile servicers to collect small installment payments from groups
of borrowers.17  Under this model, Grameen Bank has maintained an av-
erage loan repayment rate of 95%.18  The Grameen Bank attributes such a
high repayment rate to the powerful social pressure of its group lending
model and its local loan servicing approach.19
Largely following the Grameen Bank model, the microfinance industry
expanded exponentially in the 1980s and 1990s across local communities,
countries, and continents, maturing to comprise a group of sustainable fi-
nancial intermediaries with notable successful models in Indonesia and
Bolivia.20  By 2002, microfinance claimed more than 65 million customers
across five continents using loan, deposit, and insurance products,21 which
led the United Nations to declare 2005 the International Year of
Microcredit.22  In 2008, the Microfinance Information Exchange estimated
that between 1,000 and 2,500 microfinance institutions served more than
65 million customers in more than 100 countries.23  In India specifically, a
Reserve Bank of India report estimated that MFIs accounted for 22% of
all small borrower accounts, which is a larger share of accounts in the sec-
tor than the share held by large commercial banks.24  This rapid spread of
microfinance is due in part to the advantages of the microfinance business
model, which are explored in Part II.B infra.
14. Id. at xxxi.
15. Introduction, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen.com/index.php?option=com_
content&task=view&id=16&Itemid=112 (last updated July 15, 2014) [hereinafter Introduc-
tion, GRAMEEN BANK].
16. Id.
17. Credit Delivery System, GRAMEEN BANK, http://www.grameen.com/index.php?op
tion=com_content&task=view&id=24&Itemid=127 (last updated July 15, 2014).
18. Id.
19. Introduction, GRAMEEN BANK, supra note 15.
20. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at xxxii.
21. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 6, at ix.
22. Id.; see also The International Year of Microcredit, YEAROFMICROCREDIT.ORG,
http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org (last visited Dec. 4, 2014).
23. Rajdeep Sengupta & Craig P. Aubuchon, The Microfinance Revolution: An Over-
view, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan.–Feb. 2008, at 18, available at https://research
.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/01/Sengupta.pdf.
24. DR. NACHIKET MOR ET AL., RES. BANK OF INDIA, COMMITTEE ON COMPREHEN-
SIVE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR SMALL BUSINESSES AND LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS REPORT
111 (2013).
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B. Business Model
The success of microfinance as a sustainable business model largely
depends on scale, high repayment rates, and low transaction costs relative
to traditional financial institutions.  This section examines three main com-
positional elements of the microfinance business model through the scope
of MFIs in India and explains how each aspect can help bestow a competi-
tive advantage.
1. Target Population and Products
The first compositional element of the MFI business model is lending
on a scale large enough to compensate for the small amount of each loan.
MFIs offer small loans to a population of low-income potential customers,
which, by any calculation, is vast in India.25  The McKinsey Global Insti-
tute recently estimated the population of Indians with an annual house-
hold income under $16,667 at 1.05 billion and the Unitus venture capital
fund recently projected the bottom of the pyramid population in India at
997 million.26  Among this large low-income population, traditional finan-
cial institutions are not well established: an estimated 60% of rural and
urban populations do not have a functional bank account and an estimated
90% of small businesses have no links to formal financial institutions.27
While India’s size as the seventh largest country in the world by land
area28 implies that this large population segment may be dispersed and
difficult to serve, India is in the midst of a decade-long wave of massive
urbanization and has seen its urban population grow from 290 million in
2001 to 340 million in 2008.  India’s 2011 census estimates an urban popu-
lation of 377 million,29 which McKinsey estimates will grow to 590 million
by 2030 and represent 67% of the total Indian population.30  Although
MFIs are limited to serving populations in a certain income range as dis-
cussed in Part III infra and urban populations have higher average individ-
25. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 121–22.
26. SHIRISH SANKHE ET AL., INDIA’S URBAN AWAKENING: BUILDING INCLUSIVE CIT-
IES, SUSTAINING ECONOMIC GROWTH 13 (McKinsey Global Institute 2010), available at http:/
/www.mckinsey.com/insights/urbanization/urban_awakening_in_india; Defining “Base of the
Economic Pyramid” in India, UNITUS SEED FUND, http://usf.vc/resources/defining-base-of-
the-economic-pyramid-in-india/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2014). The bottom of the pyramid is a
term that refers to the portion of the world population with the lowest per capita income. See
generally, C.K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, STRATEGY+BUSINESS
(Jan. 10, 2002), http://www.strategy-business.com/article/11518?gko=9a4ba.
27. MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 3.
28. The World Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY https://www.cia.gov/li
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
29. C. CHANDRAMOULI, RURAL URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, CENSUS OF
INDIA 16 (July 15, 2011), available at http://censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_
files/india/Rural_Urban_2011.pdf.
30. SANKHE ET AL., supra note 26, at 8.
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ual incomes than rural populations,31 the urban population within the
income range that MFIs can serve under Indian law is still vast; adjusting
for inflation at an assumed rate of 9%,32 an estimated 75% of the urban
population, or 282 million people, falls within this income range.33
MFIs offer this vast population segment a range of products that vary
by size, term, and target population.  A survey of the leading for-profit
MFIs in India reveals a wide range of loan products for income-generating
activities, including 2,000–12,000 rupees ($33–193) by SKS Microfinance,34
2,000–30,000 rupees ($30–484) by Spandana,35 and 7,000–50,000 rupees
($113–808) by SHARE.36  MFIs also generally offer a number of different
products with different loan sizes for microenterprises, vehicle finance,
consumption, and farm equipment.37
The result is tremendous potential scale for microfinance loan origina-
tion and one that is expected to grow considerably.  The population of
low-income borrowers as potential microfinance customers and the co-lo-
cation of borrowers amidst Indian urbanization enables MFIs to scale
lending in such a way to cover the fixed costs associated with ultra-local
operations.  As discussed in more depth in Part II.B.2 infra, many
microfinance enterprises organize in joint liability groups in which mem-
bers recruit other borrowers in the community.  This organization in-
creases penetration in low-income communities and the volume of loan
origination.38  Government policies focused on the potential economic
benefits of extending credit to the poor also allow microfinance institu-
tions to secure cheap financing from large financial institutions and gov-
ernment lenders.39  In India, lending to MFIs counts toward large Indian
commercial banks’ requirements for priority sector lending,40 which is a
31. UNIV. OF MD., HUMAN DEV. IN INDIA 12 (2005), available at http://ihds.umd.edu/
IHDS_files/02HDinIndia.pdf.
32. Inflation India 2013, INFLATION.EU, http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/india/
historic-inflation/cpi-inflation-india-2013.aspx (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
33. Estimate based on 2011 census data and urban income distribution estimates from
a 2004 University of Maryland study. See CHANDRAMOULI, supra note 29; see UNIV. OF MD.,
supra note 31, at 12.
34. Know SKS, SKS MICROFINANCE, http://www.sksindia.com/know_sks.php (last vis-
ited Nov. 10, 2014).
35. Credit Products, SPANDANA, http://www.spandanaindia.com/products_services.
html (last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
36. Products, SHARE MICROFINANCE, http://www.sharemicrofin.com/products.html
(last visited Nov. 10, 2014).
37. See, e.g., id.
38. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 12–13.
39. See RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MONETARY POLICY STATEMENT 2011–12 (2011),
http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=6376&Mode=0#mela (explaining abil-
ity of banks to court MFI loans as priority sector loans).
40. See MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 98; SKS Microfinance Completes Securitisation
Transaction of Rs. 316.25 Crore, ECON. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2014 6:14 PM), http://articles.
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-22/news/55319021_1_sks-microfinance-priority-sector
-lending-guidelines-securitisation-transaction.
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Reserve Bank of India program designed to promote inclusion of agricul-
tural and small-scale industries in the financial system by requiring banks
to allocate a proportion of total lending to borrowers in these sectors.41
Inclusion as a priority sector borrower enables MFIs to access capital from
large commercial banks to fund expansion at relatively cheap interest rates
of about 13% to 14%.42  As discussed in Part V.C infra, MFIs are also able
to package and sell securitized microfinance loans to help large commer-
cial banks meet priority sector lending requirements.43  In combination,
priority sector lending and securitization allow MFIs to access capital and
offload risk relatively quickly, thereby supporting the ability of MFIs to
rapidly expand to meet India’s vast potential market of borrowers.
2. Joint Liability Groups
The second compositional element of the MFI business model is the
use of joint liability groups as a means to secure loans.  In this Grameen
bank innovation, MFIs lend to small groups of borrowers rather than indi-
vidual borrowers.44  Rather than each individual providing collateral, co-
borrowers act as guarantors for one another.45  Groups are voluntarily
formed, taking advantage of existing relationships within small, tight-knit
communities.46  Many Indian MFIs, such as SKS Microfinance, form joint
liability groups of five individuals that serve as guarantors for each
other.47  Between three and ten of these groups comprise a local center
where groups receive disbursements and make payments,48 although the
number of members in a group and the number of groups in a center may
vary.49  Members gather in a public forum to repay loans in weekly install-
ments to a MFI loan officer,50 who records payments in a ledger or on a
handheld device to capture collection data.51  If one group member de-
faults on a loan, the other members are responsible for the defaulting
41. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, MASTER CIRCULAR – PRIORITY SECTOR LENDING –
TARGETS AND CLASSIFICATION, RBI/2013-14/107 (2013). For a contemporary perspective of
priority sector lending requirements, see GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 9,
at 49–76.
42. MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 111.
43. See id. at 98.
44. Grameen Group Lending Model, GRAMEEN RESEARCH, http://grameenresearch.
org/grameen-group-lending-model/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
45. Id.
46. Id. (“An individual living below the poverty line, [sic] selects four people she
knows and trusts to form a group.”).
47. Methodology, SKS MICROFINANCE, http://www.sksindia.com/methodology.php
(last visited Nov. 13, 2014).
48. See id.
49. See ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 14 (citing groups of
up to 21 members).
50. Id. at 12–13.
51. See India’s 25 Leading MFIs, CRISIL RATINGS, June 2014, http://www.crisil.com/
pdf/ratings/indias-25-leading-mfis.pdf.
300 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 4:293
member’s loan payments and all members of the group are deemed ineli-
gible for subsequent loans.52
Group lending and joint liability groups provide a number of economic
advantages for MFIs.  Intuitively, group lending reduces transaction costs
associated with serving small borrowers by allowing a large number of
borrowers to conduct multiple transactions with lenders in a regular group
meeting.53  Group lending also provides a convenience benefit to borrow-
ers because loan transactions are conducted within local communities, re-
moving the need to travel.54  Perhaps less intuitively, group lending also
solves many of the problems caused by informational asymmetries be-
tween borrowers and lenders, especially among poor borrowers and large
traditional lenders.55  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch argue that the
liability structures in modern finance, revolving mainly around collateral
and credit scores, are in place to mitigate informational symmetries be-
tween lenders and borrowers.56  In other words, collateral and credit
scores serve as a reliable proxy to answer the question: will this borrower
repay this loan?  Without collateral or credit history, as is the case for
many poor borrowers, traditional lenders are left with little information to
assess the likelihood that borrowers will repay loans.57  Group lending
mitigates this informational asymmetry in two ways.  First, by forming
groups, individuals seeking loans apply better, local information to assess
the ability of others to repay loans and then form joint liability groups with
individuals most likely to repay.58  In effect, co-borrowers can assess
creditworthiness in their communities better than traditional lenders can,
resulting in more reliable groups of borrowers.  Second, loan amounts in
the group lending model generally start small and increase in size and
number as groups of borrowers prove their reliability.  In essence, these
initial loans generate valuable additional information for lenders about
borrowers as the term of a loan continues.59
In economic terms, group lending also mitigates the adverse selection
and enforcement problems that large financial institutions often encounter
in lending to the poor.60  Rational co-borrowers will not only refuse to join
a group with a potential defaulting borrower, but also will help enforce
repayment by fellow group members to ensure the group is not responsi-
ble for another borrower’s default.  Group lending can also solve moral
hazard problems by incentivizing borrowers to monitor how co-borrowers
52. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 13.
53. Id. at 86.
54. See id. at 147.
55. Id. at 51–52.
56. Id at 51.
57. Id.
58. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION AND MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 88–89.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 86.
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use funds.61  One intuitive formulation of this idea is that group borrowers
exert pressure on one another to repay loans because the entire group is
affected by non-payment.62  Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch take
this idea further, arguing that the mere threat of sanctions by the group
exerts pressure on borrowers not to shirk their repayment
responsibilities.63
Whatever the cause, microfinance has historically achieved extremely
high repayment rates by using joint liability group lending: many Indian
MFIs tout repayment rates as high as 98% and 99%.64  This well-publi-
cized achievement of microfinance institutions is a significant improve-
ment over repayment rates achieved by large financial institutions in low-
income lending; for example, loan repayment rates in India reached only
60% during the Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP),65 a gov-
ernment-sponsored financial inclusion initiative, and reached only 56% for
Indian regional rural banks, which were established in the late 1990s to
improve financial access for the poor.66
3. Customer Acquisition and Loan Servicing
The third compositional aspect of the MFI business model is an inno-
vative system of customer acquisition and loan servicing.  In isolation,
many of these tactics are not new, but in combination they fuse local com-
munity knowledge with technology to reduce costs in innovative ways.
MFIs generally acquire customers in a geographic-focused model.67  In
a typical process, an MFI will identify a target neighborhood and pockets
of potential customers through census data about income and occupation
type, such as vegetable stand owner or flower seller.68  Sales officers then
enter the identified neighborhood and make house-calls, asking for leads
about potential customers who need loans for income generating activities
or seek interest rates lower than those offered by unregulated local mon-
61. Id. at 96.
62. Id. at 13.
63. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION AND MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 13.
64. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 40, 47.  By comparison, the charge-off
and delinquency rates for all loans and leases made by U.S. banks (presumably using tradi-
tional lending criteria) was 2.72% in the fourth quarter of 2014 and 7.4% in the first quarter
of 2010. Charge-off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks, Bd.
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases
/chargeoff/delallsa.htm.  These measures of delinquency and default are not directly compa-
rable with MFI repayment rates, but provide a basis to appreciate the high repayment rates
enjoyed by MFIs.
65. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION AND MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 9.
66. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 145.
67. See V.G. NARAYANAN & V. KASTURI RANGAN, EQUITAS MICROFINANCE: THE
FASTEST-GROWING MFI ON THE PLANET 4 (Harvard Bus. Rev., 2013).
68. Id.
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eylenders.69  Once a target borrower profile is identified, MFIs and initial
potential customers seek other local community members in the same oc-
cupation or an occupation common among MFI borrowers.70  Thus, MFIs
rely heavily on initial target customers when identifying and recruiting co-
borrowers.  In the case of a five-person joint liability group, a potential
customer’s ability to borrow depends on finding four co-borrowers.  This
iterative process continues until a number of groups are identified in a
single neighborhood to form a neighborhood center.71  Sales officers then
meet with borrowers to guide them through loan applications, verify per-
sonal information, and gain basic information required for loan ap-
proval.72  For Equitas, a leading southeast Indian MFI, traditional loan
criteria like income-to-expense ratios and household income are comple-
mented with non-traditional loan criteria that verify ties to the local neigh-
borhood, such as occupation type and length of residence in the
neighborhood.73  Once loans are made, loan servicing occurs in the form
of public meetings every fortnight, in which a loan servicing officer collects
loan payments, records payments, and addresses any issues brought forth
by customers.74  For many MFIs, modern technology provides additional
operational advantages.  For example, one MFI uses a network of local
agents equipped with small, biometric devices to manage banking services,
enabling ultra-local service and reliable customer identification.75
In effect, this customer acquisition process views each neighborhood as
an individual market entry opportunity.  Sales officers use the benefits of
microfinance products, mainly lower interest rates than local lenders and
69. Id. Local, unregulated moneylenders remain a predominant lender to the poor
population of India, despite interest rates that are often astronomical and exploitative.
GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 9, at 55; Gabreile Parussini, India’s Illicit
Moneylenders Aren’t Going Away, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2015 11:05 AM) http://
www.wsj.com/articles/indias-bid-to-liberate-poor-from-illicit-moneylenders-yields-mixed-re
sults-1427295915.  For the lowest income quartile in India, local moneylenders, relatives, and
friends provided more than 70% of loans in 2007. GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N,
supra note 9, at 54.  Armendariz De Aghion and Morduch review study results related to
moneylenders that report effective interest rates between 60% and 160%. ARMENDARIZ DE
AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 28. However, the role of the moneylender is more
nuanced that simply being loansharks; moneylenders may actually serve a purpose in certain
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EDGE@WHARTON BLOG (Nov. 18, 2010), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/fino-
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convenience benefits, to attract one potential customer and then use this
new source of neighborhood knowledge to penetrate the market.  Borrow-
ers use local knowledge to recruit co-borrowers, which bridges informa-
tional gaps between lenders and borrowers and creates a customer base
with higher repayment potential.  This method of customer acquisition not
only allows MFIs to achieve scale benefits by spreading its customer base
within a local community, but also allows MFIs to match its customer ac-
quisition activities to its operating model.  In other words, if one loan of-
ficer can serve five groups of borrowers, then a sales officer can tailor
customer acquisition efforts to the number of customers that allows effi-
cient loan servicing.  The local servicing model also offers the operational
advantage of lowering overhead associated with customer service.  By cen-
tralizing loan servicing through a loan servicing officer equipped with
modern technology linked to back office systems, MFIs can reduce or
eliminate the costs of brick-and-mortar establishments and customer ser-
vice channels.  Recently, evidence indicates that large MFIs have continu-
ously revised their service model in the last few years to lower operating
costs,76 as explored in Part V.B.2 infra.
Overall, the large potential market size for microloans and the ability
of MFIs to originate loans, bridge informational gaps, and create advanta-
geous customer service models combine to make MFIs an attractive po-
tential investment for private equity investors.  In theory, each factor
rebuts a reason why microfinance seems unprofitable: the scale of loan
origination mitigates the effect of small loan sizes; joint liability groups
mitigate the risk of default associated with low-income borrowers; and op-
erational innovations mitigate the otherwise high overhead associated with
servicing a geographically dispersed customer base.  These factors also
largely underlie the widespread opinion that MFIs are wildly profitable
enterprises. Part V infra explores how these factors work in practice by
assessing the investment potential of MFIs from the perspective of private
equity investors.
III. REGULATION OF MFIS
The regulation of MFIs in India has evolved considerably in the last
half century as the Indian government has pursued a number of initiatives
aimed at increasing access to finance for poor and rural populations.77  Af-
ter gaining independence in 1947, the Indian government nationalized the
financial sector, partly to increase access to financial services throughout
the country.78  In 1968, India introduced priority sector lending within its
76. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 10.
77. Andhra Pradesh 2010: Global Implications of the Crisis in India Microfinance,
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credit policy, requiring commercial banks to direct a portion of their lend-
ing to sectors of the population that lack institutional financial support,
known as the Priority Sector.79  By the mid-1970s, commercial banks were
required to lend 40% of their credit to Priority Sector borrowers.80  In the
1970s and 1980s, the Indian government established regional rural banks
to extend financial services to rural populations and the Self-Help Group
model, which is explained further infra, to encourage commercial banks to
lend to low-income borrowers.81  According to a Reserve Bank of India
report, regional rural banks have not been profitable and have done little
to allay reliance on local moneylenders.82  On the other hand, Self-Help
Groups, which are autonomous collectives of low-income individuals who
band together for financial services,83 have enjoyed more success but are
limited in reach; in mid-2007, they comprised only about 47,000 borrow-
ers.84  In the 1990s, economic liberalization in India opened the door for
the private sector to serve poor borrowers, leading to the rise of for-profit
microfinance enterprises that originated microfinance loans.85  These en-
terprises, termed Non-Bank Financial Companies (NBFCs), were sup-
ported by the government through the state-owned Small Industries
Development Bank of India and by large commercial banks with the abil-
ity to buy securitized microfinance loans to meet priority sector lending
requirements.86  Between the 1990s and early 2000s, for-profit MFIs rap-
idly emerged on the scene, capitalized increasingly through equity invest-
ments from specialized Microfinance Investment Vehicles (MIVs) and
mainstream private equity funds.87
MFIs operated within the existing Indian financial regulatory frame-
work until events in 2010 in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh brought
new regulatory scrutiny to MFIs.  Beginning in the 1990s, Andhra Pradesh
was the capital of microfinance and home to five of India’s largest MFIs
that were also among the first MFIs to attract significant private equity




82. GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 9, at 54.
83. Sustainability of Self-Help Groups in India: Two Analyses, CONSULTATIVE GROUP
TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP) (Aug. 2007 Occasional Paper No. 12), at 1, 4, available at:
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Occasional-Paper-Sustainability-of-Self-Help-
Groups-in-India-Two-Analyses-Aug-2007.pdf. Self-Help Groups are often formed with the
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84. GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 9, at 57.
85. CGAP Focus Note, supra note 77, at 1.
86. Id. at 1–2.
87. Id. at 2.
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and MIV investment.88  MFIs grew rapidly within Andhra Pradesh, ac-
quiring nearly 30 million customers and achieving an average outstanding
debt per customer of 65,000 rupees ($1,050) in the state compared to an
average of 7,700 rupees ($125) in the rest of India.89  By the early 2000s,
MFIs in the region began to develop a negative stereotype because they
were earning high returns, awarding lavish executive compensation, and
exhibiting little transparency.90  Tensions rose in 2005 and 2006 when an
Andhra Pradesh administrative district closed 50 MFI branches in re-
sponse to allegations of unethical and illegal practices.91  Tensions then
boiled over in 2010 when the local Andhra Pradesh press linked a string of
suicides to over-lending and unscrupulous lending by MFIs.  The result
was disastrous, crippling MFIs’ reputations and loan portfolios alike: poli-
ticians blamed MFIs and their harsh collection practices for 57 suicides in
Andhra Pradesh, arrested field workers,92 urged residents to default on
loans,93 and passed restrictive legislation at the state-level regarding MFI
lending;94 nearly 9.2 million customers, about one-third of Andhra
Pradesh borrowers, defaulted and loan recovery rates fell from 95% to
10%.95  In response to the crisis and the Andhra Pradesh state’s regulatory
intrusion, the Reserve Bank of India in 2011 created a new regulatory
framework for MFIs within the NBFC category.96
A. Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs)
MFIs in India are regulated as NBFCs, a category that includes many
financial services companies such as loan companies, investment compa-
nies, and asset finance companies.97  India had a total of 12,225 registered
NBFCs as of March 31, 2013.98  A Reserve Bank of India report notes that
retail NBFCs generally outperform banks in terms of non-performing as-
88. .   CGAP Focus Note, supra note 77, at 2.
89. Id. at 3; 2011-2012 ANNUAL REPORT, SKS MICROFINANCE 12 (2012), available at
http://www.sksindia.com/downloads/SKS.Microfinance.Ltd.Annual.Report 2011-12.pdf.
90. Id. at 2.
91. CGAP Focus Note, supra note 77, at 3.
92. Discredited, ECONOMIST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/
17420202?story_id=17420202.
93. Eric Bellman and Arlene Chang, India’s Major Crisis in Microlending, WALL ST. J.




94. CGAP Focus Note, supra note 77, at 4.
95. See 2011-2012 ANNUAL REPORT, SKS MICROFINANCE 12 (2012), available at http://
www.sksindia.com/downloads/SKS.Microfinance.Ltd.Annual.Report 2011-12.pdf.
96. Banking and Finance Newsletter, CARE RATINGS, Mar. 7, 2014, at 1 [hereinafter
CARE RATINGS].
97. MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 106.
98. Id.
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sets and the credit ratings of their loan portfolios.99  While NBFCs are in
many ways regulated like banks, with capital adequacy rules, non-per-
forming asset norms, and a fair practice code,100 the regulatory treatment
of banks and NBFCs differs in a few important respects.  First, NBFCs are
subject to a 15% minimum capital adequacy requirement as opposed to a
9% requirement for banks101 under the logic that as generally niche par-
ticipants, NBFCs are much more likely to have a geographically concen-
trated asset profile relative to banks and therefore require higher capital
adequacy.  Second, regulatory classifications are more forgiving for
NBFCs than banks in defining non-performing asset (non-payment for 180
days versus 90 days), sub-standard asset (non-performing asset for a pe-
riod not exceeding 18 months versus 12 months), and doubtful asset (non-
performing asset for a period not exceeding 18 months versus 12
months).102  Third, NBFCs are subject to much lower entry capital re-
quirements than banks (20 million rupees to 50 million rupees or $320,000
to $800,000, versus 5 billion rupees or $81 million).103  Equity investments
in NBFCs from foreign sources are also partially regulated through a
tiered minimum capitalization requirement for entities with foreign own-
ership, which requires more capital for firms with higher levels of foreign
investment.104
B. Non-Banking Financial Companies – Microfinance Institutions
(NBFC-MFIs)
In 2011 and 2012, MFIs were officially recognized in regulation as the
seventh subset of NBFCs in response to the Andhra Pradesh Crisis de-
scribed supra.105  Under these regulations, NBFC-MFIs are prohibited
from accepting deposits and are subject to four general categories of re-
quirements under the new classification: (1) a minimum percentage of as-
sets that meet the definition of qualified assets under the regulations; (2)
interest rate caps applying to MFI-originated loans; (3) a net owned funds
minimum; and (4) credit reporting and customer check requirements.106
NBFC-MFIs not meeting these requirements are prohibited from ex-
tending loans to microfinance customers in excess of 10% of total assets,
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 107–108
102. MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 107–108
103. Id.
104. Id. at 110 (stating that minimum capitalization for NBFCs with foreign capital be-
low 51% is $0.5 million USD, $5 million for those with foreign ownership below 76%, and
$50 million for those with foreign ownership above 75%).
105. Id. at 111.
106. NBFC FAQ Release, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/
FAQView.aspx?Id=102 (last visited Dec. 22, 2014) [hereinafter NBFC FAQ Release].
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effectively requiring any previous NBFC focusing on microfinance to meet
these requirements.107
An MFI’s qualified assets must be at least 85% or more of the MFIs’
net assets.108  The Reserve Bank of India defines net assets broadly as
total assets other than cash, bank balances, and money market instru-
ments.109  The qualified assets definition imposes restrictions on the type
of borrower, loan size, loan tenure and loan use as follows:
Loan disbursed without collateral by an NBFC-MFI to a borrower with a
household annual income not exceeding 60,000 [rupees] (rural) or 1,20,000
[rupees] (urban and semi-urban) and total indebtedness not exceeding Rs.
50,000 will be a qualifying asset provided:
(a) loan amount does not exceed 35,000 [rupees] in the first cycle and 50,000
[rupees] in subsequent cycles;
(b) tenure of the loan not to be less than 24 months for loan amount in
excess of 15,000 [rupees] with prepayment without penalty;
(c) aggregate amount of loans, given for income generation, is not less than
70 per cent of the total loans given by the MFIs and
(d) loan is repayable on weekly, fortnightly or monthly installments at the
choice of the borrower.110
The effect of the new qualified asset provision is three-fold: first, it
restricts the type of microfinance borrower based on income, debt, and
location; second, it restricts the product offerings of MFIs in terms of loan
amounts, duration, and repayment structure; and third, it limits the opera-
tions of MFIs in other types of business by requiring microfinance loans to
comprise at least 85% of a MFI’s net assets.
Interest margin caps also apply to MFI-originated loans.111  The new
RBI regulations set the interest rates charged by NBFC-MFIs as the lower
of: (a) cost of funds plus a 10% margin for MFIs with asset sizes above 1
billion rupees and cost of funds plus a 12% margin for MFIs with asset
sizes below 1 billion rupees; and (b) the average base rate of the five larg-
est commercial banks by assets, as reported quarterly by the RBI, multi-
plied by 2.75.112  Based on cost of funds and commercial bank average
base rates, the interest rate cap is generally about 25%; for example, in
January 2014, cost of funds was between 13 and 14%, producing an inter-
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The minimum net owned funds requirement of 50 million rupees114
($800,000) as opposed to 2 million rupees for other NBFCs115 works as a
capital adequacy norm.  Calculated generally as paid up equity capital and
reserves minus certain investments and loans, the net owned funds mini-
mum ensures only entities that are well capitalized, and therefore less
likely to fail, qualify.116  The substantial increase in net owned funds under
the new regulations has the effect not only of encouraging capital reserves
and discouraging investments by MFIs in other MFIs, but also of putting a
premium on higher levels of equity investments.  Together with tiered for-
eign equity investment entry requirements, this requirement creates inter-
esting incentives for MFIs: if an MFI raises too little equity capital, it may
not meet the net owned funds requirement, thus incentivizing entities to
raise capital from all available sources; but if capital is raised in too high of
a proportion from foreign sources, MFIs are subject to higher entry
requirements.
As these new regulations restrict the product offerings, target customer
base, and diversification potential of MFIs, they also exert interesting in-
fluences on industry composition and MFI profitability.  The minimum net
owned funds requirement and restrictions on the number of MFIs serving
a borrower serve as barriers to market entry, limiting internal competi-
tion.117  The requirement that MFIs originate loans for income generation
purposes restricts MFIs’ ability to initiate consumption loans, which has
the opposite of the intended effect by driving borrowers out of the formal
financial sector to informal lenders.118  Finally, as discussed in Part V.C.1
infra, these requirements may adversely affect MFI profitability.
IV. PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN MICROFINANCE
The spread of microfinance in India and the business model advan-
tages that MFIs enjoy have attracted the attention and capital of private
114. See Exposure Norms for the Financial Institutions, RESERVE BANK OF INDIA (Aug.
7, 2003), http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=1296&Mode=0. (defining
Net Owned Funds as “consist[ing] of paid up equity capital, free reserves, balance in share
premium account and capital reserves representing surplus arising out of sale proceeds of
assets but not reserves created by revaluation of assets.  From the aggregate of items will be
deducted accumulated loss balance and book value of intangible assets, if any, to arrive at
owned funds. Investments in shares of other NBFCs and in shares, debentures of subsidiaries
and group companies in excess of ten percent of the owned fund mentioned above will be
deducted to arrive at the Net Owned Fund.  The NOF should be computed on the basis of
last audited Balance Sheet and any capital raised after the Balance Sheet date should not be
accounted for while computing NOF.”).
115. MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 111.
116. See NBFC FAQ Release, supra note 106.
117. Mor, supra note 24, at 111–12.
118. Id. at 112.
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equity investors.119  Given the many types of investors that fall under a
broad definition of private equity, investments in microfinance by private
equity investors are not new; however, investments in MFIs by profit-seek-
ing private equity funds are a recent development in the last decade.120
From an investment perspective, the risk profile of microfinance in India
has changed dramatically over the last decade.  CARE Ratings, the second
largest credit rating agency in India,121 classifies four major risk phases for
the Indian microfinance sector: high growth from 2006 to 2010, high vola-
tility from 2010 to 2011, consolidation from 2011 to 2013, and relative sta-
bility from 2013 to the present.122  Part IV analyzes the evolution of
investments in Indian MFIs by for-profit private equity funds using these
classifications.
A. Phase 1: High Growth 2006–2010
The modern microfinance sector in India spawned from government-
initiated programs such as the Self-Help Group–bank linkage program in
1992,123 as described in Part III supra.  Soon after, private sector participa-
tion in microfinance increased through growing numbers of MFIs, who
initially accessed bulk funds from banks at discounted rates and subse-
quently lent these funds to microfinance borrowers.124  Following a period
of relative stability,125 the MFI model began to grow quickly in 2006
through an increased level of debt and equity investments in MFIs.  Ac-
cording to CARE, the overall loan portfolio of MFIs and Self-Help
Groups increased nearly three-fold in three years, from 139.5 trillion ru-
pees ($2.2 billion) on March 31, 2007, to 381.8 trillion rupees ($6.1 billion)
on March 31, 2010.126
While the vast majority of funding for MFIs continued to come from
large Indian financial institutions as a way to meet their priority sector
lending obligations,127 other sources of investment capital rapidly entered
the microfinance sector during this period.  Foreign investors and invest-
119. See generally Sangeetha G., Microfinance Sector Woos Big-Ticket PE Investments,
FIN. CHRON. BLOG (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.mydigitalfc.com/news/microfinance-sector-
woos-big-ticket-pe-investments-560.
120. Margaret Brennan, Sequoia Invests $11.5 Million in Microfinance Fund, CNBC
(Mar. 29, 2007 9:17 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/17844093#.
121. About Us, CARE RATINGS, http://www.careratings.com/about-us.aspx (last visited
Dec. 2, 2014).
122. CARE RATINGS, supra note 96, at 1.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id.
125. See KANTAK, supra note 2, at 7–8.
126. CARE RATINGS, supra note 96, at 1.
127. Luis A. Viada & Scott Gaul, The Tipping Point: Over-Indebtedness and Investment
in Microfinance, MICROFINANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Feb. 2012), http://www.
themix.org/sites/default/files/MBB-%20The%20Tipping%20Point-over-indebtedness%20and
%20investment%20in%20microfinance_2.pdf [hereinafter Microbanking Bulletin].
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ment funds increased investments in lockstep with or faster than loan port-
folio growth: from 2007 to 2010, foreign investment in Indian microfinance
increased more than five-fold, from 1.88 trillion rupees ($30.5 million) to
9.92 trillion rupees ($160.3 million) and investment fund investments in-
creased between 2007 and 2010 from 2.36 trillion rupees ($38.2 million) to
8.27 trillion rupees ($133.6 million).128  This period of capital influx also
saw a rise in the average number of investors in MFIs as new investors
entered the microfinance sector; in the area of debt financing, for example,
the average number of lenders per MFI in India grew from 8.23 in 2007 to
11.53 in 2010.129
Amidst the growth in investment capital and the number of investors,
foreign private equity investments also grew quickly.  According to the
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), foreign equity invest-
ments, which includes foreign private equity investors, in microfinance in-
stitutions worldwide grew at an annualized rate of 60% from 2006 to 2010
and accounted for 18% of total foreign investment.130  Among the grow-
ing number of investors, institutional investors, including private equity
funds, international banks, pension funds, and insurance companies, were
the fastest growing, estimated by CGAP to have grown from a $1.2 billion
global investment in microfinance in 2006 to a $3.5 billion investment by
2010.131  One study of MFI ownership structures in 2010 found that inter-
national private commercial investors owned disproportionately large eq-
uity stakes in MFIs in South Asia, most of which were Indian MFIs.132
The study distinguished between international private social investors and
international private commercial investors and found more private com-
mercial investors in the South Asian region in both quantity and owner-
ship stake than anywhere in the world.133
This trend continued in the size of individual private equity invest-
ments as well; a CGAP survey based on a sample of private transactions
reported thirty-seven private equity transactions in microfinance institu-
tions globally in 2007, with an overall value of $60 million, compared to
the same number of private equity transactions in 2010 with an overall
value of $205 million.134  This period is also marked by a number of signif-
icant private equity investments in Indian MFIs: Sequoia Capital an-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Foreign Capital Investments in Microfinance, CGAP (May 2011), at 7, available at
http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Focus-Note-Foreign-Capital-Investment-in-Mi
crofinance-Reassessing-Financial-and-Social -Returns-May-2011.pdf [hereinafter Foreign
Capital Investments in Microfinance].
131. Id. at 3.
132. KANTAK, supra note 2, at 17.
133. Id.
134. Volume Growth and Volume Contraction: Global Microfinance Equity Valuation
Survey 2012, CGAP (2012), at 3, available at http://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-
Forum-Volume-Growth-and-Valuation-Contraction-Global-Microfinance-Equity-Valuation-
Survey-2012-May-2012.pdf.
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nounced an investment of 680 billion rupees ($11 million) in SKS
Microfinance in 2006;135 Dubai-based Legatum invested 1 trillion rupees
($16.2 million) in Share Microfin, a Hydrabad-based MFI, in 2007; and
Ujjivan Financial Services raised a 1.21 trillion rupee ($19.6 million) equity
round in November 2008 from existing private equity investors Unitus Eq-
uity Fund and Elevar Equity LLC and new private equity investors Se-
quoia Capital and Lok Capital.136
B. Phases 2 and 3: 2010–2013: High Volatility and Consolidation
The Andhra Pradesh crisis in 2010, discussed in Part III supra, created
a significant roadblock for private equity investments in MFIs.  With the
politicization of microfinance during the crisis, MFIs in the region exper-
ienced high levels of delinquency, resulting in massive write-offs.137  Yet,
even in the volatile investment environment created by the Andhra
Pradesh crisis, private equity investments in microfinance persisted.  Glob-
ally, the growth trend in private equity transactions continued, both in
number and size: CGAP found that cross-border funding for microfinance
amounted to over $25 billion in commitments in 2011, with private funders
accounting for about $8 billion in commitments.138  More significantly, the
study identified an average annualized growth rate in private funding of
12% (compared to 3% growth from public funders), most of which was
driven by institutional and individual investors through specialized funds,
MIVs, or holding company structures.139  In a similar period from 2008 to
2011, the equity share of total commitments increased from 9% to 13%,
partly reflecting increased investment from private equity funds, while the
debt share of total commitments during the same period decreased from
68% to 55%.140
In this period, a CGAP survey based on a sample of private transac-
tions identified thirty-seven private equity deals worldwide worth $205
million in 2010 compared to sixty-eight private equity deals worth $292
million in 2011.141  In India specifically, CGAP’s sample included nineteen
private equity transactions in 2011 worth $88.4 million despite the Andhra
135. Brennan, supra note 120.
136. Ujjivan Raises $19.6 Million of Equity Capital, INDIAPE.COM (Nov. 27, 2008) http:/
/www.indiape.com/2008/11/27/ujjivan-raises-19-6-million-of-equity-capital/.
137. See discussion supra Part III.
138. Current Trends in Cross-Border Funding for Microfinance, CONSULTATIVE GROUP
TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP) (Nov. 2012), at 1, available at: http://www.cgap.org/sites/
default/files/Brief-Current-Trends-in-Cross-Border-Funding-for-Microfinance-Nov-2012.pdf
[hereinafter Current Trends in Cross-Border Funding].  See also Research Insight: Private Eq-
uity and Financial Sector Developments in Emerging Markets, RESPONSABILITY (Mar. 2013),
http://www.responsability.com/funding/data/docs/en/1643/Research-Insight-2013-Private-Eq
uity-and-Financial-Sector-Development-in-Emerging-Markets.pdf.
139. Current Trends in Cross-Border Funding for Microfinance, supra note 138, at 1.
140. Volume Growth and Volume Contraction, supra note 134, at 4.
141. Id.
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Pradesh Crisis, compared to ten transactions worth $45 million in 2010.142
The impact of the Andhra Pradesh crisis was felt in the form of reduced
valuations for MFIs, however, as the median and average price-to-book
value ratios dropped between 2009 and 2011.143  In May 2011, CGAP also
specifically noted the trend of private equity funds targeting India:
“[s]ome of these funds, such as Sequoia and Legatum, have brought a
more aggressive, commercial high-risk/high-return investment strategy to
the industry. These investment models have helped spur the fast growth of
MFIs in India. . . .”144
C. Phase 4: 2013–Present: Relative Stability
With a more stable regulatory environment following the RBI’s adop-
tion of regulations governing NBFC-MFIs as described in Part III supra,
private equity investments in microfinance have continued to grow,
though at a pace that is difficult to assess.  According to credit rating data,
the share of foreign holdings in Indian MFIs exceeded 30% in 2014.145
This high share of foreign holdings reflects a mix of players: private equity
funds like Sequoia, Caspian, Legatum, and Citi Venture Capital; interna-
tional development funds like the International Finance Corporation; and
private foundations like the Michael & Susan Dell Foundation.146
Private cross-border equity funding for MFIs in general has increased
in this period to an estimated level of $7.5 billion in 2014147 and a number
of record-setting private equity investments illustrate this trend.  In Janu-
ary 2015, Ujjivan Financial Services raised 6 billion rupees ($111.1 million)
from private equity investors and an international development fund,
which is the largest single equity funding deal in the history of India’s
microfinance sector.148  This deal closely followed the previous record-set-
ting sale of a minority equity stake by Janalakshmi Financial Services to
TPG Capital, a US-based private equity fund, for an estimated 6 billion
rupees ($100 million) in November 2014.149  In November 2014, Equitas, a
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id. at 3.
144. Foreign Capital Investments in Microfinance, supra note 130, at 4.
145. Atmadip Ray, Foreign Investors Chasing Bigger Gains by Investing in




147. Microfinance Market Outlook 2014, RESPONSABILITY (2013), http://www.respons
ability.com/funding/data/docs/en/1872/rA-Microfinance-Market-Outlook-2014.pdf.
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leading MFI in South India, raised 3.25 billion rupees ($52.5 million) from
a consortium of private impact and development finance investors,150
while Lok Capital, a venture capital fund focused on microfinance and
social businesses in India, is reportedly in the process of raising a $100
million fund focused on MFIs.151
Overall, private equity investments in Indian MFIs have increased sub-
stantially since 2006 amidst periods of strong growth and crisis.  Having
established the advantages of the MFI business model and the extent of
private equity investments in MFIs, the question remains why private eq-
uity investors are targeting MFIs and whether this trend of increasing in-
vestment will continue.
V. MICROFINANCE AS PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT TARGETS
 The juxtaposition of private equity investors with the world’s poorest
borrowers raises the question of why private equity funds invest in MFIs.
Part V explores this question in three parts.  First, Part V describes the
criteria that private equity investors apply to potential investments in
emerging markets.  Second, it analyzes the extent to which Indian MFIs
reflect these criteria.  Third, it argues that two trends affecting
microfinance in India will make MFIs less attractive potential investments
for private equity investors in the future.
A. Private Equity Investment Criteria in Emerging Markets
This section aims to articulate the criteria that private equity investors
apply to potential investments in emerging markets at both the market-
level and firm-level to determine why private equity investors are invest-
ing in Indian MFIs.
In general, the goal of a private equity investor is to invest in portfolio
companies with high growth potential or undervalued assets, work with
management to improve performance of the business, and exit the invest-
ment to realize a significant gain.152  Investment strategies differ greatly
within the category of private equity, most notably between different types
of funds, fund sizes, target geographies, and target industries.  But the gen-
eral principles of risk, return, and value creation are similar.153  Private
equity investments typically offer higher returns than other asset classes,
but also embody greater risks and volatility; within this class, emerging
markets private equity reflects an even higher risk and return profile.154
150. Bhawna Gupta, Equitas Raises $53M Led by DEG and Impact Investment Firm
Creation Investments, CREATION INVS. (Nov. 29, 2014), http://creationinvestments.com/news/
equitas-raises-53m-led-deg-impact-investment-firm-creation-investments/.
151. Nisha Koul, MicroCapital Brief: Lok Capital of Mauritius Seeking $100m, MICRO-
CAPITAL (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-lok-capital-of-mau
ritius-to-raise-100m-for-third-fund-first-round-to-close-by-april-2015/.
152. ROGER LEEDS, PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING IN EMERGING MARKETS 23 (2015).
153. ELI TALMOR & FLORIN VASVARI, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY 4, 71 (2011).
154. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 25.
314 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 4:293
Deal origination and screening are the key steps in which private equity
funds identify and evaluate potential investments.155  In the context of
emerging market private equity, which includes investments in
microfinance, this deal origination stage requires that investors evaluate
both the viability of the investment environment of an emerging market
and the prospects of the firm in question.156
1. Investment Environment
Private equity investors seek an investment environment with baseline
protections and the ability to encourage growth at the firm-level.  The
building blocks of such an investment environment are geopolitical and
economic stability, legal enforcement mechanisms, and human capital.157
Leeds defines these building blocks in more depth, including government
policies that support the industry without impeding market forces, confi-
dence-inducing legal frameworks, efficient financial markets, political and
macroeconomic stability, acceptance of international business practices,
and deep pools of skilled human capital.158  Investors, in other words, seek
both the untapped opportunities offered in emerging markets and suffi-
cient stability, contractual certainty, and human capital to execute an in-
vestment thesis.159
Geopolitical and economic stability protects against the risk that radi-
cal changes in the investment environment will jeopardize investments.  In
the words of one expert, “[a] country’s macroeconomic profile and
creditworthiness serves as one of the cornerstones for investor confidence
and resides at the very foundation of the private equity ecosystem.”160  As
illiquid investments with a long investment horizon,161 private equity in-
vestments are especially vulnerable to economic crises and currency crises,
as illustrated by the major losses suffered by private equity portfolio com-
panies in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.162  Basic legal enforcement
mechanisms are another fundamental element to sustaining private equity
investments.  In general, the ability to rely on contracts and enforce con-
tractual terms in a fair, efficient forum is vital for any investment.163  Be-
cause private equity investments in emerging markets often take the form
of minority equity positions in high growth companies, minority share-
holder protections are also of fundamental importance.164  Lastly, human
155. Id. at 32–33.
156. Id. at 32, 57.
157. Id. at 57; TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 64–66.
158. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 57.
159. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 19.
160. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 72.
161. DAVID P. STOWELL, INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY
315–317 (2d ed. 2013).
162. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 126.
163. Id. at 62.
164. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 56, 64.
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capital presents an important prerequisite because investors are largely
dependent on the business acumen and local knowledge of managers and
operators.165  Without a deep pool of skilled workers to operate a portfo-
lio company as it grows, portfolio companies are less likely to meet their
growth potential.166
While these factors provide strong guideposts, few investment environ-
ments fully reflect these elements, including the United States.167  Short-
comings in emerging markets in many of these areas create opportunities
for private equity investors in the first place.168  The lack of access to me-
dium- and long-term finance in developing countries, for example, is cited
by a World Bank survey as the most frequently reported growth constraint
for small- and medium-sized enterprises169 and provides private equity in-
vestors with investment opportunities that would not otherwise exist.  Sim-
ilarly, human capital deficiencies can offer investors value-creation
opportunities in the form of installing competent managers and improving
employee performance.170
2. Firm Attributes
With a stable framework in which to invest, private equity investors
evaluate the prospects of a specific firm to determine if the firm fits the
fund’s investment criteria.  Investment criteria vary among the large num-
ber of investors under the label of private equity and depend on a number
of factors, including the maturity of the target company and the ownership
percentage obtained.171  For example, a buyout fund seeking to purchase
all or most of a mature company with a significant amount of debt will
value robust and stable cash flows to support debt payments172, while a
venture capital fund investing in a young company will value growth po-
tential and market size.173
Private equity investments in emerging markets often take the form of
minority equity investments due to heightened risk associated with invest-
ing in emerging markets.174  Likewise, private equity investments in
microfinance generally take the form of minority equity investments in
165. Id. at 79.
166. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 66, 68.
167. See Moody’s, S&P Weigh in on “Fiscal Cliff” Deal, CBS NEWS (Jan. 2, 2013, 6:06
PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/moodys-sp-weigh-in-on-fiscal-cliff-deal/ (quoting ratings
agency Standard & Poor’s as stating: “Washington’s governance and policymaking have be-
come less stable, less effective, and less predictable.”).
168. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 57.
169. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 21.
170. Id. at 79.
171. See generally MINORITY INVESTMENTS: OVERVIEW, PLC CORP. & SECS. (2015),
Westlaw.
172. STOWELL, supra note 161, at 315, 317.
173. PLC CORPORATE & SECURITIES, supra note 171.
174. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 72.
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young, high-growth microfinance companies, especially in India where for-
eign direct investment rules make acquiring MFIs outright difficult.175
While investment criteria and value creation opportunities still vary
among funds, private equity investors taking minority equity positions will
seek some common criteria when evaluating firms.  These generalized cri-
teria provide helpful guideposts for what constitutes an attractive invest-
ment, but ultimately the negotiated terms of each deal determines its
attractiveness.
First, private equity investors seek companies with high growth poten-
tial and profitability potential.176  Growth and profitability are common
factors across most forms of private equity investments,177 but are espe-
cially important in the context of minority equity investments in emerging
markets due to increased geopolitical and economic risk.178  Second, pri-
vate equity investors seek companies with strong management teams to
apply new funds to execute a growth strategy.179  Whether by investing in
a company with strong managers or inserting new management teams,
competent management is a key factor across investment categories.180
Third, exit potential is a key criterion because investors need some degree
of certainty that they can realize returns on their illiquid investments.181
Although simplified and generalized, these criteria cover the salient points
that multiple private equity investors in this space identify in their invest-
ment theses.  For example, Unitus Capital, a leading impact investor in
India, identifies high growth, strong profits, and excellent management as
key criteria supporting investment in Indian microfinance at all stages of
maturity,182 while Emerging Capital Partners, a private equity firm focus-
ing on Africa, invests in “high-growth companies with excellent manage-
175. MOR ET AL., supra note 24, at 110 (outlining the minimum foreign equity invest-
ment for NBFCs at different capitalization tiers: $.05 million for those with foreign ownership
below 51%, $5 million for those with foreign ownership below 76%, and $50 million for those
with foreign ownership above 75%); William Langer, The Role of Private Sector Investment
in International Microfinance and the Implications of Domestic Regulatory Environments, 5
INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 1, 63 (2008).
176. See, e.g., TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 241; STOWELL, supra note 161, at
318; Hurley Doddy & Vincent Le Guennou, Private Equity is Africa’s Best Kept Investment
Secret, THE NAT’L (Sept. 28, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/
private-equity-is-africas-best-kept-investment-secret.
177. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 359–65; STOWELL, supra note 161, at 343.
178. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 66–70.
179. See, e.g., STOWELL, supra note 161, at 317–18; Doddy & Le Guennou, supra note
176.
180. LEEDS, supra note 152, at 33. See also TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 68;
Doddy & Le Guennou, supra note 176.
181. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 153, at 72.
182. UNITAS CAPITAL, INDIA IMPACT EQUITY INVESTMENT REPORT 2013 2–3 (2014),
available at http://unituscapital.com/wp-content/uploads/Unitus-Capital_India-Impact-Equity
-Investment-Report-2013.pdf.
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ment that can take advantage of the rise in consumer spending and
increasing trade and regional integration.”183
B. Presence of Private Equity Investment Criteria in Indian MFIs
This section evaluates the existence of private equity investment crite-
ria in Indian MFIs to determine why private equity funds are investing in
Indian MFIs.  As explored infra, India and Indian MFIs meet many of the
investment criteria that private equity investors seek in potential invest-
ments, but also reflect shortcomings in a few important areas.
1. Investment Environment in India
India provides both a stable investment environment for private equity
activity and an opportunity for investors to earn strong returns.  The initial
impetus for private equity investors to seek investments in emerging mar-
kets derives in part from increased competition between private equity
firms for deals.184  Global private equity fundraising hit all-time highs dur-
ing the period of 2006 to 2008 and fundraising levels have rebounded to
near record highs in 2013 and 2014.185  The result of high fundraising
levels and buoyant capital market conditions has created “an environment
of intense competition” for deals and lifted target valuations,186 which is
causing private equity buyers to seek attractive targets in other markets;
for example, in the Asia-Pacific region, buyout and growth funds increased
64% between 2008 and 2014 to a level of $84 billion.187  Even within the
Asia-Pacific market, private equity investors faced stiff competition for
deals, causing investors to search for new investments in the middle mar-
ket and take on more risk in search for high returns.188  Together, these
competitive dynamics have shifted the focus of many private equity inves-
tors to India and the Indian microfinance sector.
As an investment environment, India offers sufficient geopolitical sta-
bility, legal enforcement certainty, and human capital to encourage private
equity activity.  India is the world’s oldest democracy and its newly elected
government has been viewed by creditors and market participants alike as
stable and supportive of macroeconomic stability.189  India’s economy is
183. Doddy & Le Guennou, supra note 176.
184. BAIN & COMPANY, GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 2015 2 (2015), available at
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/Bain_and_Company_Global_Private_Equity_Report
_2015.pdf.
185. Id. at 6–7.
186. Id. at 11.
187. Id. at 12.
188. Id. at 14.
189. See Rating Action: Moody’s Affirms India’s Baaa3 Rating; Changes Outlook to
Positive, MOODY’S INVESTOR SERVS. (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.moodys.com/research/
Moodys-affirms-Indias-Baa3-rating-changes-outlook-to-positive—PR_320605; CFA INSTI-
TUTE, GLOBAL MARKET SENTIMENT SURVEY 2015 14–15 (2015), available at http://www.
cfainstitute.org/Survey/gmss_2015_report.pdf.
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also poised for growth; the World Bank projects annual Gross Domestic
Product growth between 6% and 7% from 2015 to 2017.190  International
measures of open markets and legal enforcement mechanisms also score
India favorably relative to peer countries; in the World Bank’s 2014 Enter-
prise Surveys, which assess business environment conditions in emerging
markets, India scored well in indicators of open, developed financial mar-
kets such as external financing and use of the financial markets compared
to peer countries in South Asia and countries of a similar income pro-
file.191  India also performed well in these surveys in measures of the rule
of law, identifying courts as fair, impartial, and uncorrupted at a higher
proportion than peer countries.192  Similarly, India outpaced South Asian
and income profile peers in measures of human capital, including mea-
sures of firms’ use of internationally recognized quality certification, use of
external auditors, and use of the internet.193
Despite these positive indicators relative to other developing countries,
India also reflects some shortcomings as a stable investment environment.
In the same 2014 World Bank surveys, India’s corruption scores indicated
a higher corruption level than peer countries, which can serve as an im-
pediment to growth.194  The Heritage Foundation’s 2014 Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom highlights the shortcomings of the India legal system,
including chronic corruption, an inefficient judiciary, and weak intellectual
property rights.195  But with increasing competition within the private eq-
uity industry pushing firms to seek opportunities in new markets, India’s
mix of opportunity and relative stability provides an attractive investment
environment.
2. Firm Attributes of Indian MFIs
With a relatively stable environment in which to invest, private equity
investors then evaluate whether potential investments meet the invest-
ment criteria for an emerging market, minority equity investment: growth
and profitability potential, human capital, and exit certainty. Indian MFIs
have sustained generally positive performance in these areas, giving poten-
tial investors reason for cautious optimism.
190. Global Economic Prospects: South Asia, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.
org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/regional-outlooks/sar#2 (last visited May 26,
2015).
191. WORLD BANK, ENTERPRISE SURVEYS: INDIA COUNTRY PROFILE 2014 11 (2015)
available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/~/media/GIAWB/EnterpriseSurveys/Docu
ments/Profiles/English/India-2014.pdf.
192. Id. at 10.
193. Id. at 14.
194. Id. at 9.
195. 2015 Index of Economic Freedom: India, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage
.org/index/country/india (last visited May 26, 2015).
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a.  Growth and Profitability Potential
Loan portfolio growth rates, measures of operational efficiency, and
loan repayment rates provide empirical indicators of MFI growth and
profitability potential.  Because few MFIs are publicly traded, data to as-
sess these measures of growth and profitability are limited to a few pub-
licly traded MFIs and credit agency reports with select financial metrics.
Nonetheless, this limited financial dataset provides insight into MFI scale,
portfolio quality, and financial sustainability.
By any measure, the extent of recent MFI loan portfolio growth is re-
markable.  MFI loan assets grew at a 42% Compound Annual Growth
Rate (CAGR) for the two-year period ending March 2014,196 which is a
decrease from the loan asset growth rates of more than 100% that were
prevalent before the Andhra Pradesh crisis in 2011.197  CRISIL, one of
India’s major credit rating agencies, projects MFI loan assets to triple from
103 billion rupees ($1.91 billion) in 2010 to 350 crore ($6.4 billion) in
March 2015.198  India Ratings & Research, another credit agency, recently
estimated that the microfinance sector will grow at a CAGR of 24% be-
tween 2015 and 2019, driven by both increased disbursements to existing
borrowers and doubling its borrower base.199  Within this environment of
expansion, MFIs are still comfortably exceeding the capital adequacy reg-
ulatory requirement of 15% with many maintaining capital above 30%,
which implies adequate capital to fuel continued growth.200
Profitability metrics for Indian MFIs, on the other hand, lead to mixed
conclusions, despite widespread belief that Indian MFIs are wildly lucra-
tive.201  One study by the Council of Microfinance Equity funds estimates
profit margins in Southern Asian MFIs, primarily though respondents in
India, as the lowest of any region surveyed at 4.7% in 2005, 5.3% in 2007,
and 6.4% in 2008.202  Table 1 below provides a more detailed view of MFI
profitability by aggregating Return on Assets (ROA) metrics, calculated
as net profit divided by average total assets, for India’s largest eleven
MFIs from the Microfinance Information Exchange Market database,
196. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 8.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Microfinance Sector to Grow Strongly at 24% Annually over FY15-FY19, INDIA
RES. & RATINGS (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.indiaratings.co.in/showDetails.jsp%3Bjsession
id=2E397D694CCC2388FE4C9E126FDD89A6?fileName=/upload/sectors/pressReleases/
normal/2015/1/30/indra30Micro.htm.
200. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 10.
201. Atmadip Ray, supra note 145 (“Microlending may be small, but it is probably the
most lucrative and profitable segment in Indian financial services with a potential to charge
as high as 27.75%, as more than half [of] the Indian population is untouched by organised
finance.”).
202. KANTAK, supra note 2, at 13–14 (calculating profit margin as profit divided by
revenue).
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which aggregates institutional data from MFIs across the world to broaden




Bandhan Financial Services Pvt Ltd 6.4% 4.7% 5.0%
Equitas Micro Finance Pvt Ltd 2.3% 2.7% 3.7%
Janalakshmi Financial Services Pvt Ltd 0.5% 2.0% 2.9%
Shree Kshetra Dharmasthala 1.6% 2.6% 2.2%
SKS Microfinance -46.7% -15.7% 2.9%
Ujjivan Financial Services Pvt Ltd 0.3% 3.4% 3.5%
Average - Large MFIs -6.0% -0.1% 3.4%
Average (Adjusted for Andhra Pradesh Crisis) 2.2% 3.1% 3.5%
Medium MFIs
Cashpor Micro Credit 2.5% 3.6% 3.3%
ESAF Microfinance and Investments Pvt Ltd 0.6% 2.1% 2.0%
Grama Vidiyal Micro Finance Ltd 0.1% 0.6% 0.5%
Grameen Financial Services Pvt Ltd 0.2% 0.3% 1.3%
S.M.I.L.E. Microfinance Ltd 3.0% 1.0% 1.4%
Medium MFI Average 1.3% 1.5% 1.7%
Combined Average (Adjusted)- Top 11 MFIs 1.7% 2.3% 2.6%
Scheduled Commercial Banks (Average) 1.0% 1.1% 0.8%
Return on Assets (ROA)
TABLE 1: PROFITABILITY OF 11 LARGEST INDIAN MFIS 2010-2013
(IN RS. CRORE).204
While a general lack of uniform data beyond that published by
Microfinance Information Exchange and credit rating agencies prevents
analysis of additional metrics, the ROA figures in Table 1 show a generally
positive profitability picture for India’s largest MFIs.205  Compared to
other Indian financial institutions, the average ROA for India’s eleven
largest MFIs of between 1.7% and 2.6% looks quite strong; by compari-
son, the Reserve Bank of India reported that the average ROA for India’s
schedule commercial banks, a category that includes India’s largest banks,
ranged from 1.0% in 2011 to 0.8% in 2013.206  However, MFI access to the
subsidies, grants, and loans at below-market interest rates may undermine
the credibility of these strong ROA figures.207  A World Bank report ad-
vises investors and donors to adjust profitability metrics to account for
203. Microfinance Institutions, MICROFINANCE INFO. EXCHANGE MKT., http://www.
mixmarket.org/mfi (last visited May 26, 2015).
204. All MFI data derived from MIX Market dataset. Id.
205. Id. at 10.
206. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA, FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 14 (Dec. 2014), available
at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/FSR29122014_FL.pdf.
207. Richard Rosenberg, Measuring Results of Microfinance Institutions, CONSULTA-
TIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (June 2009), at 8–11, available at http://www.cgap.org/sites/
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borrowings below market interest rates, receipt of goods and services be-
low market prices, and the effect of inflation.208  Given appropriate data,
the resulting adjusted profitability metrics may provide a different, less
rosy picture of MFI profitability.
Evidence also indicates that MFIs are coupling loan portfolio expan-
sion to increase revenue with improved operational efficiencies to reduce
costs.209  CRISIL estimates that the average number of borrowers per
branch for MFIs has steadily increased from 2,500 in 2011 to 3,400 in 2013,
with a corresponding decrease in average operating expense ratio from 8.6
in 2010–2011 to 6.5 in 2012–2013.210  The operating expense ratio com-
pares an MFI’s portfolio yield with its personnel and administrative ex-
penses, so this decrease implies that MFIs are servicing loans more
efficiently as they continue to expand their loan portfolios.  As shown in
Table 2 below, among the largest six MFIs in India, operating expense
ratios have decreased consistently since 2010.  The same trend holds true
for the next five largest Indian MFIs.
MFI Name Operating Expense Ratio 
 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 
Bandhan Financial Services Pvt Ltd 5.1% 4.5% 3.4% 
Equitas Micro Finance Pvt Ltd 7.8% 7.5% 6.4% 
Janalakshmi Financial Services Pvt Ltd 21.5% 13.5% 9.0% 
Shree Kshetra Dharmasthala 4.5% 3.9% 4.5% 
SKS Microfinance 9.9% 11.2% 8.9% 
Ujjivan Financial Services Pvt Ltd 15.3% 11.1% 8.5% 
    
Average 10.7% 8.6% 6.8% 
TABLE 2: OPERATING EXPENSE RATIOS OF INDIA’S
SIX LARGEST MFIS211
But like the profitability metrics described above, the improving trend
in operating expense ratio may be less notable than it seems at first glance.
First, MFIs are likely to improve operating efficiency as they grow and
their staff, infrastructure, and overhead better match their loan servicing
needs.212  In this sense, operating efficiency improvements by large MFIs
are normal.  Second, operating efficiency will improve as MFIs favor
larger loans over smaller loans; as one World Bank report states, servicing
default/files/CGAP-Technical-Guide-Measuring-Results-of-Microfinance-Institutions-Mini
mum-Indicators-That-Donors-and-Investors-Should-Track-Jul-2009.pdf.
208. Id. at 9. The CGAP guide’s Subsidized Cost of Funds Adjustment compensates for
the effect of soft loans to MFIs by inserting a market interest rate in lieu of the actual interest
paid by the MFI. Id. The In-Kind Subsidy Adjustment quantifies the benefit of discounted
goods and services by substituting the estimated market cost of goods and services for the
actual cost. Id. The Inflation Adjustment reflects the loss in real value of an MFI’s net
monetary assets due to inflation. Id.
209. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 9, 11.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 24–48.
212. Id. at 12.
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six loans of $50 is more expensive than servicing one loan of $300.213
Therefore, this improvement could result from large MFIs shifting the fo-
cus of loan portfolios to wealthier borrowers within the microfinance-eligi-
ble segment.
Lastly, in combination with loan portfolio expansion and improved ef-
ficiencies, high repayment rates on MFI-originated loans bolster growth
and profitability by preserving the spread between cost of funds and lend-
ing rates.  Whether due to the advantages of joint liability group struc-
tures,214 the growing involvement of credit bureaus in assessing the
borrowers, or the improved use of technology in collection, MFIs have
enjoyed very low loan delinquency rates since 2010.215  Excluding MFIs
based in Andhra Pradesh, MFI loans more than thirty days past due make
up less than 1% of total loans by India’s twenty-five largest MFIs over the
past five years and loans more than ninety days past due make up less than
0.5% of total loans for these MFIs in the same period.216  CRISIL reports
that Indian MFI collection rates average over 99%, but even such a high
collection rate may result in high loan loss rates depending on the average
term of the loan.217  Regardless, high repayment rates are required for
MFIs to be profitable and continue to grow their loan portfolios.
b. Human Capital
Indian MFIs face significant human capital challenges as they seek to
scale operations and balance financial and social returns.  Many MFI foun-
ders hail from the traditional banking sector, such as Janalakshmi’s
Ramesh Ramananthan, former head of derivatives for Citibank in Europe,
and Equitas’s PN Vasudevan, former head of retail banking at the Devel-
opment Credit Bank.218  Recent high-profile hires also follow this trend,
with MFIs recently hiring away the Managing Director and CEO of ICICI
Prudential V Vaidyanathan and HSBC’s head of global banking and mar-
kets Tarun Kataria.219  This banking sector talent pipeline is responsible
for building the popular sentiment expressed by the Indian Business Stan-
213. Rosenberg, supra note 207, at 12.
214. See ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION AND MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 51–52.
215. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 9, 21.
216. Id. at 11.
217. Richard Rosenberg, Measuring Microcredit Delinquency, CONSULTATIVE GROUP
TO ASSIST THE POOR (June 1999 Occasional Paper No. 3), at 11–12, available at http://www.
cgap.org/sites/default/files/CGAP-Occasional-Paper-Measuring-Microcredit-Delinquency-
Ratios-Can-Be-Harmful-to-Your-Health-Jun-1999.pdf [hereinafter Measuring Microcredit
Delinquency].
218. Anita Bhoir, Bankers Made a Beeline for Top-Paying NBFCs, MFIs, INDIAN EX-
PRESS (Sept. 16, 2010), http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/bankers-make-a-beeline-for-
toppaying-nbfcs-mfis/682099/.
219. Id.
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dard that MFIs are “led by slick CEOs with Harvard degrees,”220 and it
reflects the trend that MFI boards and investors favor strong finance and
management backgrounds in the upper levels of management.
However, high-profile founders and executives aside, MFIs face signifi-
cant human capital challenges at every level of their organizations as MFI
growth has outpaced human capital capacity.221  In a 2008 study by the
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation, management quality was
ranked as the top risk to MFI operations by more than 300 industry re-
spondents from across the world.222  At the senior management level,
MFIs face the inherent challenge of balancing financial and social mis-
sions, with pressure from investors and government pushing in opposite
directions.223  In this sense, neither traditional banking nor traditional
non-profit experience alone will suffice to meet the demands of leading a
MFI.
The talent gap is most acute at the middle management level because
of the decentralized nature of branch operations and the geographic dis-
persion of borrowers.224  A 2009 study led by the Grameen Foundation
and ShoreCap Exchange found that MFI talent gaps were most acute in
middle management.225  In the study, SKS Microfinance and BASIX, two
large Indian MFIs, both acknowledged that rapid expansion posed unique
challenges for middle managers in charge of branches in specific geo-
graphic areas.  As one BASIX executive stated, “[e]ach branch manager is
like a CEO.”226  As demand for these soft skills increases, MFIs are fo-
cused on developing training programs to build capacity within their or-
ganization to meet these needs.227  Thus, private equity investors likely
view human capital challenges in Indian MFIs as both challenges and op-
portunities for value creation.
c. Exit Potential
Private equity investors in Indian MFIs have two primary methods to
realize returns on their investments: selling equity positions directly to
strategic and financial buyers and selling equity positions as a part of a
220. Raghuvir Badrinath & Praveen Bose, How Janalakshmi Got to the Top, BUS.
STANDARD (June 19, 2012), http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/how-jana
lakshmi-got-to-the-top-112061900029_1.html.
221. Ross et al., No Footsteps to Follow: the Talent Gap in the Development Finance
Sector in India, GRAMEEN FOUND. (Jan. 2009), at 7 available at http://www.microfinancegate
way.org/sites/default/files/mfg-en-paper-no-footsteps-to-follow-the-talent-gap-in-the-develop
ment-finance-sector-in-india-2009.pdf.
222. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
223. Id. at 6.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 8.
226. Id. 8–9.
227. Id. at 11.
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MFI IPO or acquisition.228  Overall, Indian MFIs reflect positive exit po-
tential through the sale of equity interests to strategic and financial inves-
tors despite a lack exit activity through traditional routes such as IPOs and
mergers and acquisitions.
Private equity investors plan exits before making investments and the
method of exit is determined by a number of factors, including the level of
market development projected at the time of the exit, the size of the eq-
uity stake in question, and the maturity and ownership structure of the
MFI.229  With the marked increase in investments in MFIs between 2006
and 2010, the current exit environment is active; MicroRate/Luminis re-
ports that at least two microfinance-focused equity funds and six hybrid
funds worth about $600 million are schedule to mature between 2014 and
2016.230  While the specific terms of exits and the identities of buyers are
often not revealed,231 several reports of successful exits from investments
in Indian MFIs have emerged recently.
The direct sale of equity positions can take many forms and is often
negotiated within initial investment contracts according to a specific time
horizon.232  Generally, investors sell stakes to strategic buyers within the
microfinance ecosystem, such as other shareholders or other MFIs, or to
financial buyers outside of the microfinance ecosystem, such as regional
banks and venture capital funds.233  For example, Kalpathi Investments, a
Chennai-based investment firm, sold a 10% stake in Equitas Micro Fi-
nance to U.S.-based private equity fund Sequoia Capital in 2010234 and
Lok Capital, a private equity firm, sold its stake in Delhi-based MFI Satin
Creditcare to an equity fund backed by development-focused investors
like the International Finance Corporation in 2013.235  Equity investors
also negotiate exits within an investment contract at a designated time in
228. Daniel Rozas, The Art of the Responsible Exit in Microfinance Equity Sales, CON-
SULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR (CGAP) (Apr. 2014), at 2, available at: http://
www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Forum-Art-of-the-Responsible-Exit-April-2014.pdf.
229. Id. at 3.
230. Id. at 1.
231. See, e.g., A’kos Szebeni, Microcapital Brief: Lok Capital Sextuples Investment with
Partial Exit from Indian “Socio-Commercial” Outsourcing Firm RuralShores, CREATION
INVS. (May. 9, 2014), http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-lok-capital-sextuples-in
vestment-with-partial-exit-from-indian-socio-commercial-outsourcing-firm-ruralshores/
(“[T]he buyer and the terms of the sale were not disclosed . . . .”).
232. Rozas, supra note 228, at 2.
233. Id. at 4.
234. Courtney Snelling, Microcapital Brief: India’s Equitas Micro Finance Restructures
Microfinance Business under Singhivi Investment and Finance, CREATION INVS. (Feb. 27,
2012), http://www.microcapital.org/microcapital-brief-indias-equitas-micro-finance-restruc
tures-microfinance-business-under-singhivi-investment-and-finance/.
235. Nicole Boyd, Microcapital Brief: Indian Microfinance Institution Satin Creditcare
Sells 20% Equity Stake for $8m from Danish Microfinance Partners, MicroVest II, ShoreCap
II; Lok Capital Exits, CREATION INVS. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.microcapital.org/micro
capital-brief-indian-microfinance-institution-satin-creditcare-sells-20-equity-stake-for-8m-
from-danish-microfinance-partners-microvest-ii-shorecap-ii-lok-capital-exits/.
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the future.236  For example, fixed-term investment vehicles build exit tim-
ing into the investment prospectus.237  In addition, MFIs can work with
existing shareholders to create a liquid secondary market for MFI equity
stakes and encourage participation in subsequent fundraising rounds; Uj-
jivan’s $19.6 million equity round in 2008 included such a feature, with
Ujjivan and two existing investors offering to buy out part or all of the
stakes of the round’s investors in the future.238
Exits through company sales to strategic buyers and IPOs, although
more common private equity exits in general,239 are less common exits for
Indian MFIs.  Strategic sales in the form of mergers and acquisitions are
rare, but are beginning to take shape following the merger of Arohan Fi-
nancial Services and Intellecash, which analysts speculate will signal con-
solidation among Indian MFIs.240  IPOs are also relatively rare among
Indian MFIs and entail more controversy.  Beginning with Rakyat Indone-
sia’s listing on multiple exchanges in South Asia, IPOs became a popular
fundraising route for mature MFIs, culminating in the high-profile IPOs of
Banco Compartamos in Mexico in 2007 and SKS Microfinance in India in
2010241  The ability of these firms and others to engage in successful public
offerings indicates increased liquidity of MFI shares and the rise of a
broader base of private investors interested in microfinance.242  However,
such public offerings have also drawn criticism from the microfinance
community; as discussed in greater detail in Section V.C.3 infra, some the
most pointed criticism was leveled by the founder of modern microfinance
Muhammad Yunus in his comments about the SKS Microfinance IPO.243
C. Trends Affecting the Risk Profile of MFIs
 While the Indian investment environment and the firm attributes of In-
dian MFIs meet many of the criteria that private equity investors seek, this
Note argues that two main trends undermine the attractiveness of MFIs as
investment targets in the future.
236. Rozas, supra note 228, at 2.
237. Id.
238. Ujjivan Raises $19.6 Million of Equity Capital, INDIAPE.COM  (Nov. 27, 2008) http:/
/www.indiape.com/2008/11/27/ujjivan-raises-19-6-million-of-equity-capital/.
239. STOWELL, supra note 161, at 319.
240. Dinesh Unnikrishnan, IntelleCash Acquires Arohan MFI, LIVEMINT.COM (Sept.
13, 2012, 2:19 PM), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/Dy3Z439qXwf002xuy2YAqO/In
telleCash-acquires-Arohan-Microfinance.html.
241. Langer, supra note 175, at 14.
242. Id. at 15.
243. See Eric Bellman, IPO Pits Profits vs. Altruism, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2010, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703609004575355460120599280 (“An
IPO gives a wrong message.”).
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1. Effect of MFI Regulations and Risk of Deteriotating
Lending Standards
New regulation of NBFC-MFIs by the Reserve Bank of India will have
both direct and indirect effects on MFI profitability that will make MFIs
less attractive investment targets.
As discussed in Part III supra, new Reserve Bank of India regulations
impose interest margin caps on MFI-originated loans, a minimum quali-
fied assets threshold, and credit reporting and customer check require-
ments.244  Interest margin caps of 10% for large MFIs will likely have a
direct effect on MFI profitability because they lower revenue by narrow-
ing the interest rate spread between the cost of funds and lending rates;
CRISIL predicts a resulting decline in profitability of 0.3% to 0.4% each
year for 2015 and 2016 due to the new regulations.245  With an average
ROA for India’s eleven largest MFIs of 1.7% to 2.6%246, as shown in Ta-
ble 1 supra, such a decrease could have a significant effect on MFI
profitability.
The indirect effects of new RBI regulations, however, may have a
greater impact on MFI profitability.  The qualified assets provision re-
quires MFIs to dedicate 85% of their loan portfolios to microfinance
loans; limits the population of borrowers based on annual income levels;
and bans MFIs from collecting deposits.247  The cumulative effect of these
requirements is to limit the potential market of borrowers and constrain
MFIs’ potential to offer different products.  In other words, these new reg-
ulations limit the ability of MFIs to seek alternative revenue sources
outside of existing customer segments.  For MFIs seeking growth, the most
logical remaining choice is to optimize their current business by cutting
operating costs and increasing the number of loans to existing customers
with annual incomes below the regulatory threshold of 60,000 rupees for
rural borrowers and 120,000 rupees for urban borrowers.248  As Tables 1
and 2 supra indicate, India’s large MFIs are already heading in this direc-
tion by steadily improving operating efficiency and increasing loan portfo-
lio sizes in existing customer segments.249
But operating costs are necessarily linked to loan portfolio size and
repayment rate; in other words, the extent to which MFIs can cut operat-
ing costs is limited by practical realities of loan servicing and origination.
As MFIs pursue rapid portfolio growth and continue to lower operating
costs, they also increase the number of borrowers and regions that MFI
244. NBFC FAQ Release, supra note 106.
245. India’s Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 10.
246. MICROFINANCE INFO. EXCHANGE MKT., supra note 203.
247. NBFC FAQ Release, supra note 106.
248. Id. (limiting the population of borrowers based on annual income levels not ex-
ceeding 60,000 rupees ($970) for rural borrowers and 120,000 rupees ($1940) for urban bor-
rowers, and total indebtedness not exceeding 50,000 rupees ($808)).
249. India’s 25 Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 8, 12.
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employees must cover, eroding the ability to service loans conveniently
and maintain lending standards while increasing the risk of lower repay-
ment rates and higher levels of delinquency.  Faced with new regulatory
requirements to conduct credit checks on borrowers and a decreasing
number of branch employees per borrower, MFIs are also likely to rely
more heavily on credit bureaus to assess the creditworthiness of custom-
ers, the same means of assessing creditworthiness of priority sector bor-
rowers that has failed commercial banks in India for decades.250  Such a
trend would in turn erode the foundational informational advantages asso-
ciated with joint liability groups,251 namely ultra-local knowledge of co-
borrowers and close community ties.  While joint liability groups still miti-
gate adverse selection problems, limiting the informational advantages of
joint liability groups will likely cause MFIs to choose less qualified bor-
rowers and experience lower repayment rates as a result.
An emphasis on loan origination may also incentivize employees to
approve loans that should otherwise not be approved.  In other words, the
combination of under-qualified, autonomous middle managers252 with in-
centives that emphasize loan volume growth could lead to a streak of im-
prudent loans.  In combination, diminishing the advantages of joint
liability groups and lending to less reliable borrowers could decrease col-
lection rates from the incredibly high collection rates MFIs typically enjoy,
which would have a devastating effect on MFI profitability.  A CGAP
study about MFI delinquency rates illustrates the enormous impact on
profitability that small declines in collection rate can have: while an MFI
with a 99% collection rate could lose between 1% and 12% of its average
portfolio annually depending on loan cycles, an MFI with 95% collection
rate could lose between 5% and 60% of its average loan portfolio annu-
ally.253  The experience of SKS Microfinance during the Andhra Pradesh
crisis is an extreme but illustrative example; in 2011, repayment rates in
Andhra Pradesh as a while dropped to nearly 10%, causing SKS to experi-
ence a 396% increase in provisions and write-offs and a 1318.8% decrease
in profit after tax, despite maintaining a 95.5% repayment rate outside of
the region.254
A deterioration of loan repayment rates also threatens to have a
macro-level impact on the Indian economy.  Microfinance loans are the
second largest source of asset-backed securities in India comprising about
17% of the total Indian securitization market.255  In 2013 to 2014, 39 bil-
lion rupees ($722 million) of MFI loans were packaged and sold as asset-
backed securities, mainly to bank customers seeking to meet priority sec-
250. GOV’T OF INDIA PLANNING COMM’N, supra note 9, at 49–50.
251. See ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION AND MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 88–89.
252. Ross et al., supra note 221, at 7–9.
253. Measuring Microcredit Delinquency, supra note 217, at 5.
254. See 2011-2012 ANNUAL REPORT, SKS MICROFINANCE 39 (2012), available at http://
www.sksindia.com/downloads/SKS.Microfinance.Ltd.Annual.Report 2011-12.pdf.
255. India’s Leading MFIs, supra note 51, at 14.
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tor lending obligations.256  Despite the fact that microfinance loans are
generally unsecured, rating agencies like CRISIL tout 99% collection ra-
tios on MFI loans and characterize securitized microfinance loans as offer-
ing a “high degree of safety to investors.”257  Thus, deteriorating loan
standards could trigger higher default rates on individual loans, which
would directly affect the purchasers (and potentially issuers) of these
securitized loans.
2. Regulatory and Social Risk
Regulatory and social risks rooted in India’s microfinance history will
also continue to threaten MFI profitability and the ability of private equity
investors to exit investments in MFIs.
a. Regulatory Risk
Regulatory risk is prominent throughout the financial services sector,
but is especially prominent in the context of financial services for very
poor populations.  Rating agencies point out that regulatory risk, though
alleviated by RBI regulations after the Andhra Pradesh crisis, remains the
biggest investment risk facing MFIs.258  Most immediately, the threat re-
mains that state governments will intervene for reasons similar to the
Andhra Pradesh crisis or for other politically expedient reasons.  Govern-
ment intervention at any level could trigger massive defaults, which would
produce very unprofitable periods similar to SKS Microfinance’s 2011 per-
formance.  But regulatory risks run well beyond state government inter-
vention.  Because the primary source of MFI funds is commercial banks
seeking to meet priority sector lending obligations through MFI-originated
loans,259 any alteration to the priority sector classification of MFI loans
could seriously threaten the MFI business model by limiting access to capi-
tal.  It is not far-fetched to imagine a scenario in which publicity of unscru-
pulous lending could incite debate about MFIs, resulting in a change to
priority sector lending regulations or existing regulatory classifications.
Economic downturn could have a similar effect.  Already, the fall of the
rupee has caused delays in planned exits by private equity firms from their
investments in MFIs.260  While India has enjoyed and is projected to con-
tinue to enjoy Gross Domestic Product growth in the near future,261 any
macro-level economic downturn affecting India’s poor populations could
endanger high collection rates, trigger defaults, and spur government
intervention.
256. Id. at 9.
257. Id. at 18.
258. See, CARE RATINGS, supra note 96, at 2.
259. See Microbanking Bulletin, supra note 127.
260. Namrata Acharya, Rupee Fall Clogs PE Exit Routes in MFIs, BUS. STANDARD
(Aug. 30, 2013, 12:09 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/article/finance/rupee-fall-clogs-
pe-exit-routes-in-mfis-113082800458_1.html.
261. The World Factbook, supra note 28.
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b. Social Risk
 The ethical ambiguity of profit-seeking investors in microfinance also
presents significant risk of social backlash, which this Note will refer to as
social risk.  As MFIs attempt to balance financial returns and social mis-
sion, the ethical debate rages over the suitability of profit-seeking inves-
tors in microfinance.
For opponents of profit-seeking investors in microfinance, including
Muhammad Yunus, microfinance is a social movement in which profit-
seeking investors have only a limited role.  For Yunus and his supporters,
microfinance is a social business pursuing goals of financial inclusion and
poverty reduction and any focus on profits is a diversion from the basic
principles of microfinance.262  While social businesses in concept harness
the discipline of the market to operate efficiently, social benefits are the
ultimate goal and profits are reinvested in the business to increase the
scale and, therefore, the social impact of the enterprise.263  Microfinance
initiatives in the United States largely follow this social business model264
and investment statistics reflect the presence of development financial in-
stitutions and social investment funds in Indian microfinance.265
Opponents of profit-seeking investments in microfinance present ethi-
cal and economic objections to the role of profit-seeking investors.  In eco-
nomic terms, they object to profit-seeking investors taking capital away
from social businesses in the form of returns when that capital would oth-
erwise be reinvested to provide additional credit for poor borrowers.
Profit-seeking investors, in other words, limit the ability of social busi-
nesses to impact the lives of the poor when they exit.  Yunus articulated
this view following the IPO of SKS Microfinance, which was the first IPO
by an Indian MFI: “Microcredit should not be presented as a money-mak-
ing opportunity. It is an opportunity to make an impact on poor people’s
lives.  An IPO gives a wrong message.”266  In ethical terms, opponents of
profit-seeking investors in microfinance argue that rich lenders exploit the
socio-economic position of the poor to lend at high interest rates, thus
reinforcing the socio-economic status quo.267  Most notably, Yunus him-
262. Indian MFIs Should Not Charge More Than 20 pc Int Rate: Yunus, ECON. TIMES
OF INDIA (Feb. 27, 2011, 11:10 AM) http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-02-27/
news/28638530_1_interest-rates-loans-cent (quoting Muhammad Yunus); Introduction,
GRAMEEN BANK, supra note 15.
263. See generally MUHAMMAD YUNUS, CREATING A WORLD WITHOUT POVERTY
(2007).
264. See ACCION, http://www.accion.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (describing Accion
International, the largest microfinance organization in the US, as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit or-
ganization that solicits donations to support its efforts).
265. Foreign Capital Investments in Microfinance, supra note 130, at 8.
266. Bellman, supra note 243.
267. See generally Louise Armitstead, Microfinance is Under Threat From Greed, TELE-
GRAPH (June 30, 2012, 9:48 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksand
finance/9366979/Microfinance-is-under-threat-from-greed-and-its-the-poor-who-are-suffer
ing.html.
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self has called profit-seeking MFIs “loan sharks” and urged such MFIs to
refer to themselves as commercial lenders rather than as microfinance
institutions.268
Proponents of profit-seeking investments in microfinance, including
Carlos Danel and Carlos Labarthe, the founders of Mexico’s microfinance
bank Compartamos, argue that profit-seeking investors expand the impact
of microfinance by providing much-needed capital for businesses and
funding more loans for poor entrepreneurs.269  In the view of the Com-
partamos co-founders, structuring microfinance as a profit-seeking busi-
ness creates a mutually beneficial relationship between businesses and
consumers that maximizes the impact of microfinance on the poor.270
We are great believers that, in order to reach scale, in order to serve people
with better products and services, in this case financial services to the low-
income sector, that a private sector approach, a commercial or business-
minded approach, has a lot of virtues to it . . . having private capital benefit or
profit from your operations drives performance to a different level.271
In this view, private sector investment provides the capital and operational
discipline to maximize the impact of microfinance.  Similarly, the manage-
ment strategist and scholar C.K. Prahalad articulated a similar argument
for profit-seeking businesses serving the world’s poor.
In short, the poorest populations raise a prodigious new managerial challenge
for the world’s wealthiest companies: selling to the poor and helping them
improve their lives by producing and distributing products and services in cul-
turally sensitive, environmentally sustainable, and economically profitable
ways.272
While Prahalad’s work focused on businesses across industries, his con-
cepts are largely indicative of the economic argument in favor of profit-
seeking investments in microfinance: effective development efforts are
those that connect to the poor through entrepreneurship.  MFIs promote
entrepreneurship by providing loans to poor borrowers for income-gener-
ating projects, and the incentive effects of profits help spread entrepre-
neurship.273  Vikram Akula, the founder of SKS Microfinance, followed
268. Profit-focused MFIs are Loan Sharks: Yunus, TIMES OF INDIA (Feb. 21, 2011, 6:37
AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Profit-focused-MFIs-are-
loan-sharks-Yunus/articleshow/7537341.cms.
269. Elisabeth Malkin, Microfinance’s Success Sets Off a Debate in Mexico, NY TIMES
(Apr. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/05/business/worldbusiness/05micro.html
?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
270. Id.
271. Interview by Thunderbird School of Global Management with Carlos Danel, Co-
CEO, Compartamos Banco, Glendale, Az. (Feb. 10, 2009), available at https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=GUIbQsHJ1n8.
272. C.K. Prahalad, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid, STRATEGY+BUSINESS
(Jan. 10, 2002), http://www.strategy-business.com/article/11518?gko=9a4ba.
273. See C.K. Prahalad: ‘The Poor Deserve World-Class Products and Services’,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON BLOG, (Jan. 24, 2008), available at http://knowledge.wharton.u
penn.edu/article/c-k-prahalad-the-poor-deserve-world-class-products-and-services/.
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the same reasoning as the Compartamos co-founders and Prahalad when
SKS was gearing up for its IPO in 2010: “[t]he only place you can get the
amount of money that is needed to help the poor is in the capital markets.
That’s why we are doing this IPO.”274
Proponents of profit-seeking investments in microfinance also rebut
ethical objections by emphasizing relatively low interest rates, institutional
limits on predatory lending, and the progress of consumer protection ini-
tiatives.275  By Indian standards, the average interest rate for MFI loans of
25% is cheap compared to the average interest rates of other institutions
that lend to poor borrowers: studies estimate an average interest rate be-
tween 65% and 160% for moneylender borrowers.276  Recent RBI regula-
tions imposing interest rate caps on lending277 and limits on the amount of
credit extended to individual borrowers278 also directly address the risk of
MFIs engaging in predatory lending.  The MFI industry response to the
Andhra Pradesh crisis led to the establishment of the Microfinance Institu-
tions Network (MFIN), a self-regulatory body committed to increasing
transparency and consumer protection in the microfinance industry.279
In the view of the author, the benefits of increasing access to finance
for poor entrepreneurs outweigh the risks of predatory lending.  The re-
cent Reserve Bank of India regulations provide fundamental protections
against the risk of predatory lending and the net benefit of shifting bor-
rowing from local moneylenders at average interest rates of 65% to MFIs
at an average interest rate of 25% falls in large part to poor borrowers.
From a macro-economic perspective, MFIs may also provide a partial an-
swer to the age-old Indian problem of bringing a massive, poor, geographi-
cally dispersed population out of the shadows and into the formal financial
sector, which could benefit the Indian economy as a whole and raise the
standard of living across India.280  The most ominous risk, in the author’s
view, is systemic; as MFIs chase portfolio growth and subsequently off-
load the risk by securitizing loans, lending standards could deteriorate and
increase the risk of massive default.  This risk highlights the need for credit
rating bureaus and self-regulatory agencies like the MFIN to effectively
monitor MFIs and their borrowers.  The debate over the suitability of
profit-seeking investments in MFIs is far from resolved and will continue
274. Bellman, supra note 243.
275. Consumer Protection in Microfinance Exceeds 15-Million-Client Mark via Smart
Certified Institutions, CENTER FOR FIN. INCLUSION BLOG (Feb. 19, 2015), http://cfi-blog.org/
2015/02/19/consumer-protection-in-microfinance-exceeds-15-million-client-mark-via-smart-
certified-institutions/; 2012-2013 ANNUAL REPORT, SKS MICROFINANCE 44 (2013), available
at http://www.sksindia.com/downloads/SKS-Annual-Report-2012-13.pdf.
276. ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 6, at 28; MOR ET AL., supra
note 24, at 37.
277. NBFC FAQ Release, supra note 106.
278. Id.
279. V.G. NARAYANAN & V. KASTURI RANGAN, EQUITAS MICROFINANCE (B): RE-
SPONSE TO THE ANDHRA PRADESH CRISIS 2–3 (2013).
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to exist as long as social investors and profit-seeking investors invest side-
by-side in the market.  But for a profit-seeking investor, the suitability of
an investment in microfinance is an essential part of the MFI risk profile,
at the very least as the risk of social backlash and regulatory response.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall, microfinance is a powerful innovation in personal finance that
has the potential to affect the provision of credit to underserved popula-
tions across the world.  India, in particular, provides fertile ground for
microfinance to grow, evidenced by the rapid growth of MFIs since 2006.
During this period, profit-seeking private equity investors have increas-
ingly invested in Indian MFIs, seeking abnormal returns from the scale
and operational efficiencies that MFIs offer.  Indeed, many have success-
fully exited such investments, cashing in on periods of tremendous growth
in loan origination.281  However, this Note argues that, based on available
data, MFIs are unlikely to meet the investment criteria of private equity
investors in the near future for two main reasons.  First, new regulatory
provisions are likely to have a negative impact on MFI profitability in the
near future.  Second, the debate still rages about whether profit-seeking
investors are suitable investors for enterprises serving very poor popula-
tions, which presents significant political and public relations risks for pri-
vate equity funds regardless the ethical issues involved.
281. See, e.g., Bruhadee Swaran, Pre-IPO Investors of SKS Microfinance Hit Part-Exit
Button; Investments Still Profitable, VC CIRCLE (Jan. 21, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://
www.vccircle.com/news/2013/01/21/pre-ipo-investors-sks-microfinance-hit-part-exit-button-in
vestments-still-profitable.
